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THE FIELD OF INVENTION
Saurabh Vishnubhakat*
I. INTRODUCTION
The balance of power between the administrative state and the
federal courts as guardians of the U.S. innovation system is in significant
transition. Amid growing dissatisfaction with the expense and
opportunity costs of patent litigation and the perceived strategic
advantages that patent owners enjoy in the judicial process, the political
branches have placed considerable new authority in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") directly calculated to supplant
the primacy of courts in resolving disputes over patent rights.
Amid this shifting balance of power, courts can no longer afford to
ignore, assume, or improvise a pervasively important administrative
power that the USPTO exercises regularly and capably: technology
classification.' It is surprising that the problem has persisted for so long
in the first place, as technological classification is foundational to the
law and policy of the patent system. Patent exceptionalism in
administrative law explains some (but not all) of the historical judicial
disregard for classification issues, and in any case, the explanation does
not justify the error.
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author was formerly the principal legal advisor to the Chief Economist of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). The arguments in this article are the author's and should not be
imputed to the USPTO or to any other organization. Sincere thanks to Chris Cotropia, John Duffy,
Stuart Graham, Jay Kesan, Zorina Khan, Sapna Kumar, Alan Marco, Adam Mossoff, Arti Rai, Mark
Schultz, Ted Sichelman, Melissa Wasserman, and the participants of the Notre Dame Law School.
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1. See Heather J.E. Simmons, Categorizing the Useful Arts: Past, Present, and Future
Development ofPatent Classification in the United States, 106 LAw LIBR. J. 563, 563-64 (2014).
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The origins and initial effects of the shifting balance are cause for
significant judicial caution as the USPTO grows into its enlarged role,
particularly in those matters of administrative process that reveal the
boundaries between the agency and the courts. Administrative
ascendancy in the patent system was formalized quite recently in 2011,
pursuant to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.2 Moreover, the
foundations for that formalization are not much older, dating largely
from the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Dickinson v. Zurko3 and
contemporaneous legislative and scholarly debates about the USPTO's
expertise and exceptional treatment as compared with the main body of
administrative law.4 In other words, the shift toward administrative
preeminence is an explicit policy choice of the political branches and is
also a relatively new phenomenon whose empirical assumptions and
expected effects are still being studied. For these reasons, courts'
ongoing scrutiny of their own changing authority is more important than
ever, particularly in classification issues, because taxonomy matters
deeply to patent law.
Ex ante, the patent system's ability to promote innovation rests on
enforcing several sets of requirements for granting patents, and these
requirements all depend on classification. For example, patents must be
granted only to inventions that are sufficiently inventive. Patents must
sufficiently disclose the inventions in operational detail.6 Patents must
present sufficiently clear boundaries of what they do and do not claim.'
Once granted, patents must be enforced only against accused products
and processes that sufficiently overlap with the inventive content over
which the patent confers ownership.! But, in each respect, sufficient by
what standard?
Most of these inquiries are evaluated from the perspective of the
"person having ordinary skill in the art" ("PHOSITA") to which the
patented invention pertains.9 Like the "reasonably prudent person" in
tort law, the PHOSITA is a frequently debated figure in the patent
literature. How should it be characterized? How does it shape the
practical effect of patent doctrines individually and in concert with each
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.).
3. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
6. See id. § 112.
7. See id.
8. See id. § 103.
9. Id
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other? Should it be the only (or even primary) point of reference in the
patent system?
Ex post, too, the evaluation by commentators, courts, and
ultimately Congress of how well the patent system is fulfilling its
instrumental aims and of what reforms may be appropriate relies to a
significant extent on underlying taxonomic choices."o Among
commentators, and in response to patent jurisprudence, a robust
economic and legal literature has now emerged reexamining the unitary
formal structure of the U.S. patent system, in which the standards of
patentability and the parameters and costs of patent acquisition,
maintenance, and enforcement are nominally uniform across technology.
Meaningful technological distinctions have long existed, of course,
and to take account of them, these uniform standards and parameters are
often applied in disparate ways. This suggests that patent law may
actually be technology-specific as a practical matter and raises the
normative possibility that it should be technology-specific as a formal
matter as well. At times, Congress has even accepted the invitation to
legislate in specific technologies, such as surgical methods and, more
recently, business methods, despite the ever-present difficulty of
classifying technologies and drawing lines of legal force among them."
Yet, for all the doctrinal debate over the PHOSITA and theoretical
development in approaches to technology-specific policy analysis, there
has been little systematic discussion on the antecedent question of how
the USPTO and the courts should identify the art or technology itself,
the field of invention. In this regard, what matters most is not necessarily
the "correct" taxonomic method but rather who should decide. In
administrative terms, what institutional allocation of authority is most
likely to produce desirable outcomes over time?
The lack of discussion on allocating this authority has far-reaching
effects. Nearly every major doctrine in patent law relies on the concept
of a field of invention, but neither the case law nor the literature explores
how legal actors should identify the field of a particular invention or
even how they do make this identification. At times, this determination
may be structured and, at other times, improvised. The power to classify,
however, pervasively implicates issues of expertise and administrative
law exceptionalism that are now animating the shift away from courts
and toward the USPTO as the principal locus of patent law
and policymaking.
10. See infra Part I.C.L
11. See Fariba Sirjani & Dariush Keyhani, 35 US. C § 287(c): Language Slightly Beyond
Intent, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 29-30 (2005); infra Part II.C.1.
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This Article theorizes that power to classify in three parts.1 2 Part II
offers a positive account of how the USPTO currently classifies
inventions prior to examination and how those classifications fare in
judicial review.13 Prominent in this account are discussions of the
USPTO's congressionally authorized system of classification, the
USPTO's organization of its patent examiner corps, and the USPTO's
institutional competence for assigning the field of invention. 14 To place
this account in context, Part II concludes with a historical discussion,
both of the USPTO's anomalous status as an expert agency and of the
growing salience of patent policy choices that differentiate on the basis
of technology." Part III traces the legal and institutional implications of
the positive account set forth in Part II by showing that the field of
invention underlies virtually all of patent doctrine, from the requirements
for obtaining a patent, to the limitations on enforcing a patent, to the
policy levers for assessing the health of the patent system.' 6 Part IV
addresses the proper allocation of taxonomic authority between the
USPTO and the courts.' 7 Ordinary administrative law principles point
toward judicial deference for the USPTO's classification decisions as a
means to better balance the aims of accuracy and quality in patent
examination with the values of uniformity and predictability in
judicial review."
II. IDENTIFYING THE FIELD OF INVENTION
The taxonomic exercise looks quite different in the administrative
process than it does in the federal courts. These differences reflect
historical court-agency dynamics within patent law and have important
normative implications for the health of the patent system. This Part
discusses those descriptive differences, implications, and dynamics in
three Subparts.' 9
Subpart A reveals that the USPTO, when asked to define the scope
of patent rights, exercises its taxonomic authority and identifies the field
of invention through a highly structured process involving centralized
intake, application of a published comprehensive classification system,
12. See infra Parts II-IV.
13. See infta Part I.
14. See infra Part I.A-B.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part H.A-C.
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and distribution to patent examiners with appropriate expertise.20 Yet
courts, when asked to evaluate or vindicate patent rights, either make
little more than ad hoc findings about the field of invention or overlook
the inquiry altogether.21 Subpart B argues that judicial disengagement
from the USPTO's taxonomic efforts is a waste of scarce institutional
resources and that remedying the disengagement would produce
efficiency gains. 22  Subpart C situates this particular court-agency
relationship within the more broadly anomalous and evolving
administrative process of the patent system, particularly the growing
salience of technology-specific policy and its attendant need
for classifications.23
A. Current Practice
1. In the Patent Office
The legal sufficiency of patent applications to issue as patents is
evaluated in the USPTO by a corps of some 9300 patent examiners.24
Beyond enforcing procedural formalities, the USPTO must substantively
assure that its examiners grasp the technological details of inventions in
order to reach meaningful conclusions about whether they represent true
advances to the state of knowledge in their respective disciplines. 25 For
this reason, the USPTO requires that all of its examiners possess, at
minimum, a bachelor's degree in a field of physical science, life science,
engineering, or computer science.26 In this way, examiners serve as the
USPTO's institutional proxies for persons having ordinary skill in a
wide range of arts. 27 The USPTO's institutional process recognizes,
however, that one must first identify the art before determining what
ordinary skill in that art might look like and who might possess it.28
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part H.C.
24. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2014), www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf
25. Id. at 137-39.
26. Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last modified Mar. 11, 2017, 1:44 AM).
27. Daralyn Durie & Mark Lemley, A Realist Approach to the Obviousness ofInventions, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1010-11 (2008); cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective ofPHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 888 (2004)
("The technological skill of patent examiners may provide a proxy for the tacit knowledge of
PHOSITA, but examiners are at best former practitioners whose practical technological skills
inevitably decline with time.").
28. See Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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Accordingly, before a patent application appears on an examiner's
docket, the application is first sent to be classified.2 9
For this, the USPTO maintains the Office of Patent Classification,
staffed by technical specialists who initially review applications to
determine the fields to which they pertain.3 0 Each review includes the
patent application specification, with its technical background of the
claimed invention, as well as the patent claims themselves." The review
also includes the inventor's own characterizations of the field of her
invention, provided in a section of the application form entitled "Field of
the Invention," which is part of the more general "Background of the
Invention" section.32
Based on this review, classification specialists assign to the
application a primary technology class and several search classes.33 The
purpose of the primary class is to identify directly the application's field
of invention.34 In this way, the primary class becomes the examiner's
starting point when searching for prior art within the appropriate field of
endeavor." The search classes are related to the primary class and serve
the same purpose: for the examiner to locate additional potentially
relevant prior art, and to do so more readily and accurately.36 Only after
the Office of Patent Classification identifies the field of invention is the
application routed to an examiner with expertise in that relevant field.37
Classification specialists make taxonomic identifications upon
reference to the U.S. Patent Classification System ("USPC"), a
comprehensive hierarchy of technological fields and subfields that is
promulgated and maintained by the USPTO.3 ' To apply the USPC,
classification specialists rely on the USPTO's Manual of Classification,
29. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (USPC) §§ 1.1, 1.4.1 (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/patents/resources/classification/overview.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM].
30. Id §§ 1.1-4.
31. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 608.01(a) (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter MPEP].
32. Id. (directing the applicant to provide "background" and "field" information regarding the
claimed invention).
33. See OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, §§ 1.5-6.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HANDBOOK OF
CLASSIFICATION 11-12 (2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION].
37. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, § 1.8.
Examiners themselves are grouped by their broad and specific fields and subfields of expertise,
from high-level "technology centers" down to specific "art units." Id.
38. Search Patent Classification Systems, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., www.uspto.gov/
web/patents/classification/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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which is accessible in subject-matter order 9 and alphabetical order of
the technology class designations.4 0 In developing and updating this
taxonomy, the Office of Patent Classification relies on five conceptual
grounds to organize technological information: (1) by the industry or use
that the technology serves, (2) by the proximate function that the
technology accomplishes, (3) by the effect or product that the
technology produces, (4) by the structure or physical configuration that
the technology reflects, or (5) by some combination of these aspects.41
The current classification system consists of 438 numbered classes
of utility patents, each containing increasingly specific subclasses.42
Each class is identified by a unique class number, and each subclass is
identified by a subclass number that is unique within a given class,
which may contain decimal digits or alpha characters, or both. A class-
subclass pair uniquely identifies the precise location of an invention
within the taxonomy.43 For example, U.S. Patent No. 7,052,096 by
inventor Nagao Miyazaki claims a vehicle antilock brake control
system. 44 It was originally grouped in class 303 (fluid-pressure and
analogous brake systems), subclass 123 (for a tractor-trailer type
vehicle), and currently remains in that classification.45
The USPTO periodically revises the USPC and classification
manual to account for the continually evolving nature of technology and
systems for classifying technology.4 6 A reclassification project may
create new classes and subclasses, modify the scope of existing classes
and subclasses, and consolidate or abolish obsolete classes and
subclasses.47 The project concludes with an official reclassification order
39. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CLASSES WITHIN THE U.S.
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: ARRANGED BY RELATED SUBJECT MATTER (2012), www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/patents/resources/classification/classescombined.pdf
40. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CLASSES WITHIN THE U.S.
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM: ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER (2012), www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/patents/resources/classification/caa.pdf
41. HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION, supra note 36, at 3-5.
42. Id. at 5; Select US Classes by Number with Title Menu, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm (last updated July, 10, 2012, 7:08
AM).
43. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, § 1.1;
HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION, supra note 36, at 4, 20-23; see also Select US Classes by Number
with Title Menu, supra note 42 (listing class numbers and titles).
44. U.S. Patent No. 7,052,096 (filed Aug. 7, 2002) (issued May 30, 2006).
45. '096 Patent. The original classification appears on the face of the patent as it was issued in
May, 2006. '096 Patent. The current classification reflects all updates to the USPC since that time,
which have not affected the '096 Patent. For images of a given patent as issued and for full-text
information of the patent as most recently updated, see Patent Full-Text Databases, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., patft.uspto.gov (last modified May 1, 2015).
46. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, § 1.1.
47. Id § 1.9.
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that lists all the changes that have been made to the USPC, and provides
a concordance from the old to new hierarchy.48 Similarly, if a patent
application is amended so substantially during examination that the
technological subject matter to which it pertains requires an examiner
with sufficiently different expertise, the USPTO also provides for mid-
stream reassignment of the primary technology class of the application
or the examiner art unit to which the application will go, or both.49
In sum, the USPTO's process for identifying the field of invention
for a given patent application is highly organized in its structure,
systematic in its application, and adaptable to maintain full coverage of
technological subject matter over time.
2. In the Courts
By contrast, federal courts faced with patent validity or
enforcement issues that implicate the field of invention seldom make the
identification at all. When they do make the identification, it is usually in
passing and by fiat, with no accompanying analysis.so This may take
several forms in practice."
One approach is simply to declare the field of invention.5 2 For
example, the court in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.
stated that U.S. Patent No. 5,333,273 "relates to the field of computer
circuitry and, more particularly, keyboard-input processing for ISA
[Industry Standard Architecture]-compatible personal computers." 53 As
it happens, the patent specification contained its own language, supplied
by the inventor, regarding the field of the invention.54 The overlap of the
patent's self-definition with the definition adopted by the court is
unclear: "The present invention is in the field of microprocessor-based
computer systems, and, more particularly, is in the field of computer
48. Id.
49. Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of
Invention 6-7 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Economic Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/JSPTOeconomic_WP_2015-01_v2.pdf
50. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. C 08-986 SI, 2009
WL 3007916, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) (stating that the patent related to the field of "data
processing").
51. See, e.g., id; B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., No. 09-347-JJF-LPS, 2010
WL 2219667, at *1 (D. Del. June 3, 2010) (referring to the field of invention as relating to
"peripheral intravenous I.V. catheters" without reference to patent's language); Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 2009 WL 3007916, at *17; Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp. 79 F. Supp. 2d 422,
427 (D. Del. 1999) (stating that the subject matter of the patent related to "the field of biosensors").
52. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2009 WL 3007916, at *17; Samsung Elec. Co. v.
Quanta Comput., Inc., 2006 WL 2547452, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 1, 2006).
53. Samsung Elec. Co., 2006 WL 2547452, at *1.
54. U.S. Patent No. 5,333,273 (filed Sept. 3, 1992) (issued July 26, 1994).
[Vol. 45:899906
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systems based upon the Industry Standard Architecture ("ISA") utilizing
the Intel 80x86 microprocessors and equivalents."" The court retained
the patent's reference to the ISA framework, but in place of the patent's
specific references to "microprocessors," the court generalized to
"computer circuitry."56 In place of the patent's references to "computer
systems," the court narrowed its definition to a certain subset, "personal
computers."" Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court limited
its definition to a particular mode of processing, "keyboard-input
processing," that was not in the inventor's definition of the field
of invention."
Similarly, the court in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Samsung
Electronics Co. stated that U.S. Patent No. 5,623,434 "relates to the field
of data processing."5 As before, the patent contained its own definition:
"The present invention relates to multiplier circuitry for use in a data
processing system. In particular, the present invention relates to a
structure and method for using an arithmetic and logic unit ("ALU")
within a multiplier circuit.""o The court simply took the most general
phrase from this definition, "data processing," and adopted it as the field
of invention.6 '
A slightly different approach is to adopt the patent's own
expression of the field of invention, either with or without a citation
signaling that this is what the court is doing. 6 2 For example, the court in
Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp. stated that U.S. Patent No.
5,436,161 "relates to 'the field of biosensors,"' and cited to the patent
itself.63 The patent's own definition was as follows:
The present invention relates to the field of biosensors and is more
specifically concerned with methods for providing metal surfaces with
surface layers capable of selective biomolecular interactions. The
present invention also comprises activated surfaces for coupling a
desired ligand; surfaces containing bound ligand; and the use of such
surfaces in biosensors. 64
55. '273 Patent col. 11. 11-15.
56. See Samsung. Elec. Co., 2006 WL 2547452, at *1.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. C 08-986 SI, 2009 WL
3007916, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009).
60. U.S. Patent No. 5,623,434 col. 11. 10-13 (filed July 27, 1994) (issued Apr. 22, 1997).
61. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2009 WL 3007916, at *17.
62. See, e.g., Biacore v. Thermo Bioanalysis Corp. 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 427 (D. Del. 1999).
63. Id.
64. U.S. Patent No. 5,436,161 col. 1 1. 15-21) (filed July 22, 1994) (issued July 25, 1995).
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Meanwhile, the court in B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Medical
Corp. stated without citation that U.S. Patent No. 7,264,613 "relates to
the field of peripheral intravenous I.V. catheters, and in particular, to the
field of safety I.V. catheters." 65 The patent's own definition was as
follows: "This invention relates generally to intravenous ("I.V.")
catheters, and, in particular, to a safety I.V. catheter in which the needle
tip is automatically covered after needle withdrawal to prevent the
healthcare worker from making accidental contact with the needle tip." 66
In both cases, the court relied on the inventors' own conceptions of what
fields of invention their work advanced. 7
In none of the cases discussed above, however, did the courts
defend or even explain why their taxonomic approaches were
appropriate. 6 These courts were not necessarily wrong on the merits of
their respective findings about the field of invention in each case. One or
more of these courts may even have employed an approach that could be
desirable as a general rule. Such a rule might, for example, be to define
the field of invention as the inventor does, as was apparently the case in
Biacore and B. Braun Melsungen.69 Alternatively, the rule might be to
define the field of invention using the broadest language that the
inventor's own definition can support, as occurred in Advanced Micro
Devices.70 With no rule of decision, however, all approaches (and no
approach) are possible among the small fraction of cases in which the
courts make any specific finding about the field of invention.
B. Implications of the Current Practice
There is, therefore, a significant disparity between the organized
classification process of the USPTO and the federal courts' ad hoc or
nonexistent determinations of the field of invention. These omissions by
the courts create disuniformity and unpredictability both for patent
owners who cannot foresee the standards by which the scope of their
rights will be determined and for potential infringers who cannot reliably
evaluate how patent boundaries, which they must respect in order to
avoid liability, will be determined. This phenomenon alone would
65. B. Braun Melsungen AG v. Terumo Med. Corp., No. 09-347-JJF-LPS, 2010 WL
2219667, at *1 (D. Del. June 3, 2010).
66. U.S. Patent No. 7,264,613 col. 1 1. 18-22 (filed May 23, 2003) (issued Sept. 4, 2007).
67. See B. Braun Melsungen AG, 2010 WL 2219667, at *2; Biacore, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
68. See B. Braun Melsungen AG, 2010 WL 2219667, at *15; Biacore, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 472-
73.
69. SeeB. Braun Melsungen AG, 2010 WL 2219667, at *3-5; Biacore, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
70. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. C 08-986 SI, 2009 WL
3007916, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009).
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warrant doctrinal reform to encourage greater judicial discipline in
identifying the field of invention.
What is worse, in those rare instances when courts do make
findings about the field of invention, in whatever manner, they use that
information unsystematically as well. Some courts may take a capacious
view of the patent's scope and conclude it is broad enough that the
accused product or process infringes one or more of the patent's claims,
whatever the litigants and ultimately the court may construe those claims
to mean. Claims to a broad field of invention, however, would stand
among a commensurately broader population of prior art references that
may render the patent invalid altogether. Conversely, other courts may
take a narrow view of the patent and find a commensurately smaller
population of prior art references to be relevant. In the latter, the patent
may survive a challenge to its validity, but its narrow scope may also
make it that much less likely to capture otherwise infringing conduct.
To be sure, this tension between a patent's validity and
infringeability as competing forces on the breadth of the patent's scope
is not inherently problematic but merely part of the formal structure of
the patent system." There may properly be broad or narrow patents just
as there may be pioneering or incremental inventions to deserve them.7 2
The shortcoming in the current judicial practice of ignoring, assuming,
or improvising the field of invention is that it evinces no principled rule
of decision that might give reasonable certainty to creators,
implementers, and consumers of technology about how an important
threshold question, with pervasive effects on their rights and obligations,
will be answered.
This kind of legal certainty is necessary for a well-functioning
market system within which knowledge assets can be commercialized
effectively." Although the legal rights that patents represent may be
"probabilistic"74 in the descriptive sense that eventual legal outcomes are
not perfectly foreseeable, the patent system's instrumental goals of
71. See generally Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL
L. REv. 71 (2013) (explaining the asymmetries and tradeoffs implicit in the relationship between the
validity of patents and the capacity of patents to be infringed).
72. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
499-502 (2004). For a comprehensive theoretical treatment of why pioneering inventions ought to
receive commensurately broad patent rights, see id
73. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront ofPatentability, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 609, 610 (2009) ("Patents convey property rights, and a substantial degree of certainty is
usually thought to be helpful, or even essential to well functioning property rights."). For a concise
set of sources that support this proposition, see id. at 610 n.1.




fostering innovation and economic productivity cannot be met unless
legal processes, such as technology classification, that have far-reaching
impact throughout patent doctrine are sufficiently certain (i.e., are both
clear enough and durable enough) to attract reliance and investment.
Empirical estimates bear out this theoretical expectation as well. The
resolution of legal uncertainty over patent validity and patent
infringement is, on average, worth as much to a patent-owning firm as
the initial grant of the patent right is worth.7 6 In other words, the
unpredictability of judicial decision-making can force the market to
discount, by as much as half, how much trust to put in the legal rights
that the USPTO regularly issues.77
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that divergent judicial behavior in
identifying, and potentially misidentifying, the field of invention has led
patent practitioners to caution against providing any succinct
information in the patent document about the field of invention. 78 New
evidence from an empirical study of issued patents spanning nearly forty
years shows a marked decline in the willingness of inventors to disclose
their own views of what fields their inventions occupy.7 9
The study examined a random sample of 10,000 patents issued
between January 1, 1976, and December 31, 2014.0 Because the number
of patents issued each year has fluctuated in a generally upward trend,
the sample was weighted to include patents from each year in proportion
to the number of all patents issued that year.'
The full text of these patents was then parsed for language
reflecting a concise statement of the field of invention.82 Patent
75. Duffy, supra note 73, at 616-23.
76. See Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103,
115-32 (2013) (estimating stock market reactions to the legal outcomes of patent cases sampled
over a 20-year period that spans the creation of the Federal Circuit).
77. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Ariosa v. Sequenom: In Search of Yes After a Decade of No,
NAT'L L. REv. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/printpdf/55485 (applying the Marco-
Vishnubhakat stock market reaction findings to the value of stability in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter).
78. E.g., Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina, KSR's Effect on Patent Law, 106 MICH.
L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 50, 53-54 (2007) ("[A]pplicants should avoid characterizing the field of
the invention and avoid identifying problems recognized in the art to be solved in patent
applications."). It is fitting that this type of guidance has focused in particular on the
nonobviousness requirement for patentability, as the risk of hindsight bias is already most salient
where the nonobviousness doctrine is concerned, and the likelihood that courts will use field-of-
invention information unpredictably further compounds the risk. Id. at 52.
79. See infra Figures 1-7.
80. See infra Figures 1-7.
81. For example, the patents issued in 1976 represent 1.41% of the nearly five million patents
issued during the entire observation period. See infra Figures 1-7. Accordingly, patents issued in
1976 also represent 1.41% of the random sample of 10,000 (i.e., 141 patents). See infra Figures 1-7.
82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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documents traditionally include a "field of the invention" section in the
background discussion of the specification, and inventors routinely took
the opportunity to identify the technological spaces to which their
inventions had contributed.83 Typical language for this concise statement
is found, for example, in U.S. Patent No. 7,293,045 in which the
specification states, "The present invention relates to synchronizing
data." 84 The presence or absence of this kind of statement across a large
and representative random sample, therefore, is a reasonable proxy for
the tendency of inventors to reveal useful information about the field
of invention.
As Figure 1 shows, this tendency of candor was historically quite
high, though not universal, among inventors-between eighty percent
and ninety percent.15 Starting in the mid-to-late 2000s, however, the
frequency with which issued patents now contain concise statements of
what inventors regard as their fields of invention has steadily declined.86
This decline is consistent with the view, now prevalent among patent
practitioners, that such candor can be damaging in downstream
litigation." By the end of 2014, nearly half of issued patents omitted this
information." Moreover, as Figures 2 to 7 show, this effect persists
across all major technology areas. 9
This study offers evidence of a revealed preference among
inventors for progressively less candor in identifying the field of
invention.90 That growing silence coincides with growing skepticism
among patent lawyers that courts will use such information in a
predictable or principled way, particularly in vague doctrinal subjects
such as nonobviousness.9 1 Thus, the absence of a structured judicial
83. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
84. U.S. Patent No. 7,293,045 col. 11. 23 (filed Oct. 8, 2004) (issued Nov. 6, 2007).
85. See infra Figure 1.
86. See infra Figure 1.
87. See Kunin & Beverina, supra note 78, at 53-54; see also Ping-Hsun Chen, From the
Unforeseeability Exception to Foreseeability Estoppel: The Federal Circuit's Effort to Limit the
Doctrine ofEquivalents, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 71, 94-96 (2015) (discussing the patentee-supplied field
of invention's impact upon the court's ultimate view of the field of invention in Schwarz Pharma,
Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc.).
88. See infra Figure 1.
89. See infra Figures 2-7. The six technology categories are the familiar concordance
developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research and keyed to the USPC. See Bronwyn
Hall et al., The NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools
12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), www.nber.org/papers/
w8498.pdf.
90. See infra Figure 1.
91. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 253, 269-71 (2001); Jeffrey T. Burgess, The Analogous Art
Test, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 70 (2009); Hilary K. Dobies, New Viability in the Doctrine of
9112017]
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approach to identifying the field of invention is not an idle shortcoming
but rather consistent with an information-suppressing mechanism.
The taxonomic information that has increasingly been lost from
inventors and ignored by the courts is pervasively important throughout
patent doctrine, virtually all of which rests explicitly or implicitly on the
field of invention. 92 However, if courts can begin to identify patents'
fields of invention relatively quickly and cheaply, then the current state
of inaction represents an opportunity for improvement. Administrative
law principles suggest that such improvement is within reach.93 Yet, the
anomalous and evolving place of patent law within the administrative
state is itself a complication in this regard, even though the recent
technology-specific turn in patent policy counsels quite strongly in favor
of taking taxonomic authority more seriously.
C. Technology Policy in a Second-Class Agency
Although the U.S. patent laws have historically been a set of
unitary standards that apply across all technologies, the last two decades
have seen a great deal of academic, judicial, and even legislative interest
both in identifying the technology-specific effects of facially neutral
standards and in developing technology-specific legal distinctions as a
formal matter. Necessarily, participants in this debate have begun to
confront the difficulty of classifying technologies and drawing lines of
legal force among them. To that extent, then, some legal actors in the
patent system are already primed to make use of the field-of-invention
inquiry that currently takes place in the administrative setting of
the USPTO.
For a long time, however, patent law and administrative law were,
if not in deliberate tension with each other, quite ignorant of each
other.94 The default rules established in the Administrative Procedure
Analogous Art, 34 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 227, 228-42 (1994); Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing
Invention, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1091, 1111-12; Brenda M. Simon, Rules, Standards, and the Reality
of Obviousness, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 25, 33 (2014).
92. See infra Part III.
93. See infra Part IV.
94. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007) ("[I]nattention to
administrative law principles has long been a striking feature of the patent system."); John F. Duffy,
The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of
Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1071, 1079 (2000) ("[T]he patent system. . . has been customarily
ignored in studies of administrative regulation."); Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the
Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2009) ("Throughout the twentieth
century, administrative law and intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed
off from each other in both theory and practice.").
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Act ("APA") govern agency actions and judicial review of those actions
where an agency's enabling statute has provided insufficient guidance."
Still, even though the federal patent statute provides relatively sparse
guidance on the conduct of USPTO's agency process, a number of the
APA's principles have not been applied to the patent agency.96 An
interrelated body of academic commentary, 9 7 Supreme Court guidance in
Dickinson v. Zurko,98 and recent legislation" have done much to bring
administrative law and patent law into dialogue with each other. Still,
patent exceptionalism persists, due, in significant part, to Federal Circuit
decisions leading up to Zurko'0 and afterward."o' The result is that the
patent system no longer has even the option of internal coherence
outside of administrative law,102 but neither is it fully situated within the
body of administrative doctrine yet. Still, this incompletely reconstructed
framework, mercurial though it is, remains best positioned to bring the
95. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
96. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 280.
97. See generally id. (discussing the relationship between administrative law and patent law);
Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2013) (same); Sarah Tran,
Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 831 (2012) (same);
Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (same).
98. See 527 U.S. 150, 154-61 (1999).
99. 35 U.S.C. §§ 257, 301, 311-329 (2012) (codifying new administrative proceedings for
reevaluating the validity of issued patents in the USPTO).
100. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 617-20 (2012) (tracing the
Federal Circuit's increasing constriction of the deference owed to the USPTO, from "a few loose
lines of dicta" in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to the
"single damning statement" divesting the USPTO of all substantive rulemaking authority in Merck
& Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Kali Murray, First Things,
First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29, 48-54
(2008) (discussing patent exceptionalism within administrative law).
101. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 916-17 (2004) (discussing two post-Zurko Federal Circuit decisions that
address judicial review of USPTO action, decisions that appear to be at odds with suggestions by
the Justices during the Zurko oral argument and with dicta in the Zurko opinion itself).
102. See, e.g., Merck & Co., at 80 F.3d 1549-50. Whether the particular allocation of legal
authority between the USPTO and the courts, especially the Federal Circuit, was ever coherent
enough has been the subject of considerable academic debate. Compare Michael J. Burstein, Rules
for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1776-90 (2011) (challenging the prevailing allocation
of authority in the context of agency rulemaking), and John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter
and Institutional Choice, 89 TEx. L. REv. 1041, 1054-64 (2011) (same, in the context of defining
patent-eligible subject matter), with Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1658-60 (2003) (arguing that judicial competence exceeds agency
competence in managing the problem of improvidently granted patents), and Joseph Scott Miller,
Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 65-67 (2011)




field of invention out of the USPTO and put it to meaningful use across
the patent system.
1. Discrimination by Technology
The patent system, for its part, has a great and growing demand for
taxonomy. One prominent illustration of this demand is the systemic
preoccupation with patents on business methods and software, through
which business method patents are often implemented. Among the
agency-centric reforms enacted in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
was a post-grant mechanism for challenging the validity of specifically
business method patents.103 To this end, the Act included a definition of
"covered business methods" eligible for the program (and, by
implication, ineligible), 04 authorizing the USPTO to promulgate further
definitional regulations."o' Although the wisdom of carve-outs to patent
law in overtly technology-specific ways remains a live debate, 0 6 there is
no doubt that any such differentiation necessarily requires the USPTO to
identify the field of invention and other legal actors to rely on the
USPTO's identifications.
Since its return to active oversight of the patent system,1 0 7 the
Supreme Court has also sent strong signals of a technology-specific
approach to patent law. The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., for example, addressed the legal standard for
injunctive relief in patent cases.10 However, the case itself was
motivated by concerns about the legal leverage available to entities that
do not themselves practice the patented inventions they own but solely
103. 35 U.S.C. § 321 note.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729,
788 (2006) (arguing, in the context of the USPTO's Second Pair of Eyes ("SPER") internal quality
review program, that "it is hard to envision a particular field that might be singled out with the
specificity necessary to avoid the problems encountered by the business method SPER initiative");
John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
987, 988, 1006 (2003) (concluding that "actions to single out Internet business method patents for
special treatment were not only unjustified, but also were probably futile and counterproductive"
and, more generally, finding that "fundamental problems associated with ex ante definitions to carve
out any particular technology area for different treatment").
107. See generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to
the Bar of Patents, SUP. CT. REv., 2003, at 273 (discussing the long salutary neglect of patent law
by the Supreme Court, which partly led to the creation of the Federal Circuit as a unifying force in
patent doctrine and which eventually ended with the 2002 decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabashuki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), signaling the Court's renewed interest in the
patent system).
108. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006).
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acquire and enforce patent rights at the threat of litigation.' 09 The case
provoked a high-profile concurring opinion from Justice Kennedy
categorically questioning whether business method-related inventions
should even be eligible for patent protection."1 0 The opinion's immediate
effect was to embolden critics of the patent system with regard to the
desirability of a variety of patent licensing and litigation strategies-a
debate that continues to the present-but a more subtle and perhaps
equally important effect was to highlight the need to be able to identify
business method and software patents ex ante. Indeed, since eBay, the
Court has directly taken up the patent-eligibility of software-related
inventions in its 2010 Bilski v. Kappos"'. and 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int'l decisions.1 12
Economic and legal scholars have actively engaged this interest in
technology-specificity through analyses of business method- and
software-related patents, advancing an existing debate over taxonomic
methodology itself. Two general approaches have emerged in this
literature: classifying hierarchically using the USPC and classifying
conceptually using keyword searches." Because these approaches are
capable of automation and foster replicability in empirical research,
several leading methods in the literature reflect one or both of
these approaches.
One is the Graham-Mowery method, which takes its definition of
software patents from eleven main categories in the International Patent
Classification System ("IPC"),"4 a trans-national consensus taxonomy
from which a concordance to the USPC allows comparative analysis."'
Graham and Mowery note that these IPC categories "do not cover all
software patents, but they do provide imperfect yet reliable longitudinal
coverage of a segment of the overall software industry."'16
109. Id.
110. Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. 561 U.S. 593, 601-05 (2010). Strictly speaking, the Bilski decision was concerned with
patents on business method inventions, which are often, though not always, implemented through
software. See id at 605-06. Nevertheless, subsequent case law, including the Court's own decision
in Alice, have applied Bilski to a significant extent in software-implemented technologies. Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356-57 (2014).
112. 134S.Ct.at2351-53.
113. Simmons, supra note 1, at 564-69.
114. See Stuart J. H. Graham & David C. Mowrey, Submarines in Software? Continuations in
US. Software Patenting in the 1980s and 1990s, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 443, 446 &
n.3 (2004). The IPC was established in 1971 pursuant to the Strasbourg Agreement, and it is
maintained by the World Intellectual Property Organization of the United Nations. See International
Patent Classification (IPC), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en (last
visited Apr. 10, 2017).




By contrast, the Bessen-Hunt method eschews the USPC (or any
other formal classification system) in favor of a keyword-based
search."' To mitigate the problem of false-positive results that may arise
in hierarchical methods, Bessen and Hunt proposed searching broadly
for the keyword "software" or the keywords "computer" and "program"
in the specifications of issued U.S. patents-and excluding patents
whose titles contain the keywords bus, chip, circuit, circuitry, or
semiconductor, and patents whose specifications contain the keywords
antigen, antigenic, or chromatography.1 1 s Because it does not rely on
a priori agency classifications, the Bessen-Hunt method is less likely to
produce false-negative results (i.e., less likely to ignore relevant patents
by undercounting). Yet, this benefit comes at the cost of significant risk
for false-positive results or overcounting patents to include irrelevant
patents, as a number of prominent critiques have pointed out."'
A leading mixed approach is the Hall-MacGarvie method, which
begins with a set of all those U.S. patent classes and subclasses that
contain issued patents owned by fifteen leading software firms. 12 0 The
method then combines these USPC classes and subclasses with the
Graham-Mowery IPC classes and subclasses and finds the set of all
patents that meet this combined definition.121 The method concludes by
taking the intersection of this set with the set of patents defined by a
Bessen-Hunt keyword search. 122
A fourth and recent leading alternative is the Graham-Vishnubhakat
method, which works solely from a priori classifications in the USPC,
just as Graham-Mowery worked from classifications in the PC, as a
117. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 163, 185 (2007). The Bessen-Hunt article received considerable attention
prior to formal publication, while it was still a working paper. See, e.g., Michael Noel & Mark
Schankerman, Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation 27 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance,
Discussion Paper No. 740, 2006), http://cep.1se.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0740.pdf.
118. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 42 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), www.researchoninnovation.org/
swpat.pdf. The full Bessen-Hunt analysis matches the patents found in this manner to the firms that
own those patents, and further to research and development-related as well as financial data about
those firms. Id. at 167-68. Much of this broader methodology was the subject of criticism. E.g.,
Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, A Review of Bessen and Hunt's Analysis of Software Patents 2-
8 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), www.ssm.com/abstract=467484. The present discussion
refers only to the initial Bessen-Hunt keyword search. Bessen & Hunt, supra at 185.
119. E.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents 15-
16 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12915, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl2195.pdf. Hahn and Wallsten's general critique includes this discussion as well. See Hahn &
Wallsten, supra note 118, at 2-4.
120. Hall & MacGarvie, supra note 119, at 15.
121. Id. at 13-14.
122. Id.
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means for reproducibility as well as facility with large-scale empirical
analyses. 123 The Graham-Vishnubhakat method is considerably more
finely grained than prior hierarchical definitions, drawing from dozens
of individual USPC classes and subclasses that USPTO classification
experts identified as being likely to contain "patent applications or
issued patents containing some element of either general purpose
software or software that is specific to some form of hardware."1 24 As a
result, the method much more effectively mitigates (but by no means
eliminates) the problem of over- and under-inclusivity. 125
Beyond hierarchical or keyword-based approaches, a third approach
has produced noteworthy analyses, though its lack of replicability has
limited its application to systematic adoption in patent policy: hand-
coding based on human judgment. 126 A leading adopter of this approach
has been Professor John Allison, who, with co-authors, has empirically
analyzed business method-related patentsl 27  and software-related
patents, 128 as well as a host of other technologies. 129 The preference for
hand-coding generally arises from dissatisfaction with the USPC-
indeed, sometimes with the notion of a priori classification itself-and
trades reproducibility for accuracy, given hand-coding's potential for
avoiding false-positive and false-negative results.13 0 Whatever the merits
of this tradeoff, however, human evaluation is unlikely to be an
institutionally appropriate solution for identifying the field of invention.
Courts are ill-resourced to carry out accurate-but-irreproducible studies
of this kind, and relying on litigants or third parties to do so reflects the
initial problem of finding analysis that is both principled and
disinterested.13 1 By contrast, the field-of-invention inquiry can be both,
insofar as it is the product of agency expertise and worthy of judicial
deference under generally applicable doctrines of administrative law.
123. Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, OfSmart Phone Wars and Software Patents, 27
J. ECON. PERSP., winter 2013, at 67, 75-76.
124. Id. at 75.
125. Id.
126. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, Internet Business Method Patents, in PATENTS
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 259, 266 n.19 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2003).
127. Id at 261-63, 266-78.
128. See Arti K. Rai et al., University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First
Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1534-44 (2009).
129. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration ofPatent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2108-13 (2000).
130. Id. at 2109 ("[Blecause [the authors] found the PTO's subject matter classification scheme
inadequate for [their] purposes, [they] classify the patents in [thei]r sample into areas of technology
that [they] have defined [them]selves.").
131. See supra Part II.A.2.
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All the other methodologies discussed have taken varying positions
on the relative importance of two strategies for defining a technology as
a collection of related inventions, publications, and products:
hierarchical searching and keyword-based searching.132 As Part III.C
discusses, these two strategies map directly to the evolution of patent
doctrine, particularly the question of whether an invention is truly
"inventive" in light of the prior art, as well as to the evolution of how
innovation itself is conducted.133
For present purposes, however, the question is not which
classification method is the correct one but rather who should do the
classifying and when and how. What these recent technology-specific
developments across the patent system show is considerable structural
appetite for the taxonomic expertise that the USPTO already possesses
and exercises. One may fairly ask why, given this appetite, courts do not
already avail themselves of the USPTO's expertise through ordinary
administrative law principles of deference. The obstacle is, in a
word, exceptionalism.
2. Expertise Without Deference
The basic justification for judicial deference to the actions of most
agencies-that agencies have expertise in the subject matter that they are
charged to administer-certainly applies to the USPTO.134 The modem
patent system, in the sense of a bureaucratic institution to which
Congress entrusts the substantive evaluation of inventions for
patentability, dates from nearly 180 years ago. 13 It is true that the Patent
Office of 1836, for all its empowerment under the transformative Patent
Act passed that. year, was not rationalized on the basis of expertise.13 6
Indeed, that era's broader Jacksonian ferment regarding the role of
132. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 569-71 (giving an overview of navigating the USPC
through hierarchical searching and keyword-based searching).
133. See infra Part III.C.
134. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 280-308. The Federal Circuit's own predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A."), frequently cited the USPTO's
expertise as a reason to give deference to the agency's findings-when, of course, the C.C.P.A.
actually deferred. See id. at 280 n.50.
135. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; see Duffy, supra note 94, at 1138-39. Although
the first Patent Act, enacted in 1790, required a Patent Board to grant patents to inventions or
discoveries deemed "sufficiently useful and important," the time-intensive nature of examination
soon overwhelmed the Board. Id at 1125. In reply, the 1793 Patent Act abolished the "sufficiently
useful and important" requirement and ushered in a period of registration rather than examination:
patents were freely issued ex ante, and courts bore the burden ex post of filtering worthy patents
from unworthy ones. Id. It was only after four decades of growing dissatisfaction with common law,
rather than agency-based, administration of the patent laws that the 1836 Patent Act restored
substantive examination in a more robustly empowered Patent Office. Id. at 1125-29.
136. Id. at 1138-39.
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administrative authority favored brief tenures and frequent rotation in
administrative posts so that Congress would more readily delegate
discretion to executive branch officers, who were now disciplined by
routine political removal-but this necessarily came at the expense of
opportunities to cultivate expertise through long service. 13 7 Yet, just as
surely, the patent system soon partook, albeit unevenly, of Progressive-
era reforms that were specifically calculated to foster agency expertise
and, for better or worse, favored broadly delegated power and potentially
long tenures as means to that end.138
The expected upshot of agency expertise would be that courts ought
to defer considerably to an agency's findings of fact, where specialized
knowledge and competence are of particular importance.139 This is, in
fact, the ordinary administrative law standard: factual findings in formal
agency proceedings should survive judicial scrutiny so long as those
findings are supported by "substantial evidence" 4 0 and those in informal
agency proceedings so long as they are not "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion." 4 1 Whether these standards are meaningfully
different is an open question in Supreme Court jurisprudence,1 42 but both
standards appear to entail more deference than the Federal Circuit's own
former doctrine, overturned by Zurko, that a factual finding of the
USPTO could be overturned on appeal so long as the finding was
"clearly erroneous.""4
Even after Zurko, the Federal Circuit has somewhat puzzlingly held
that USPTO findings of fact in the ex parte and relatively informal
patent examination process is subject to the substantial evidence review
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1139-40.
139. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 312-13. Benjamin and Rai argue that, in theory, courts
ought to defer relatively less to agency findings regarding law or policy, where courts are more
capable of providing meaningful review. Id. In this regard, the Chevron doctrine's deference toward
formal agency adjudications is undoubtedly a deviation, but a tolerable one inasmuch as formal
adjudications with their trial-type procedures foster transparency, guard against bias, and enable
effective judicial review through decision-making based on a well-developed evidentiary record. Id.
at 313. It is in Chevron deference for informal rulemaking that Benjamin and Rai find a "significant
exception" to the normatively desirable administrative framework. Id. at 312-13.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
141. Id. § 706(2)(A).
142. Compare Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 158 (1999) (mentioning that Ass'n of Data
Processing Service Organizations., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System., 745
F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) held that "substantial evidence" review and "arbitrary and
capricious" review entail the same level ofjudicial scrutiny), with Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412-13, 412 n.7 (1983) (suggesting that "substantial evidence"
review entails greater judicial scrutiny than "arbitrary and capricious" review does).
143. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'dsub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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that formal adjudications usually receive, not to the arbitrary and
capricious review that informal fact adjudications usually receive. 144 It
has also taken the view, contrary to the suggestive dicta of Zurko, that
substantial evidence review is a less deferential standard than arbitrary
and capricious review.145 it is not clear whether this latter move is an
attempt to scale back Zurko's actual holding that USPTO fact finding is
entitled greater deference than it has received.
What is clear is this: the USPTO has clear expertise in
classification. The courts do not, and their mix of wholesale neglect and
occasional ad hoc taxonomic declarations coincide with a notable trend
of information suppression about the field of invention among patent
applicants. 146 To remedy the situation, the courts need only look to what
the USPTO is already doing, but despite relevant Supreme Court
guidance on the matter, the anomalous place of the patent system within
administrative law has stood in the way thus far. As Part III traces, this
failure of administrative process has far-reaching doctrinal and
institutional implications, for the field of invention underlies virtually all
of patent law and policy.147
III. THE FIELD OF INVENTION AS CORNERSTONE
The basic claim of this Article is that the manner in which the
USPTO and the courts currently classify inventions (when they do so at
all) is a useful but under-explored subject for inquiry. In order to defend
this claim, it is necessary to demonstrate that existing patent law
doctrines implicate the field of invention in a way, or to an extent, that
would influence, or possibly even determine, legal outcomes differently
than is currently the case. 148 This Part does so in three Subparts.149
Subpart A explains how the full range of doctrinal requirements
concerning the validity of patents requires an inquiry into the PHOSITA
and so implicates the field of invention.`0 Subpart B then discusses what
additional doctrinal work the field of invention would do as to each of
144. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Strictly speaking, the Federal
Circuit in Gartside did not conclude that the USPTO's agency process is informal yet nevertheless
deserving of substantial evidence review. Id. at 1315 n.7. Rather, the court disputed the informality
issue itself and characterized the proceeding as a case that was, indeed, "reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute" under § 706(2)(E) of the APA-and was therefore deserving
of substantial evidence review. Id. at 1313.
145. See id.
146. See supra Part II.A.2, B.
147. See infra Part IIl.
148. See infra Part III.
149. See infra Part III.
150. See infra Part UI.A.
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these requirements.' In particular, Subpart B argues that patent law's
current lodestar-identifying the PHOSITA-is not always enough to
resolve the validity questions raised by these doctrines. 15 2 Subpart C
discusses a limited attempt in patent law toward identifying the field of
invention, the analogous arts doctrine, and explains how identifying the
field of invention goes further.153
A. Patent Validity
To be patentable, an invention must satisfy six major conditions
that are codified in the patent statute. 154 It must be new (novel),1 5
nonobvious, 15 6 and useful."' It must be described well enough in the
written patent disclosure.5 . to enable its practice.159 And it must be
claimed with definiteness. 160 Each of these conditions requires
characterizing the PHOSITA and, therefore, implicates the field of
invention. Some of these statutory conditions are expressly structured to
take account of the PHOSITA. Nonobviousness, enablement, and
written description take this form. Others are nominally viewpoint-
neutral, though, as further discussed below, these conditions require
recourse to the PHOSITA as well. Novelty, utility, and definiteness take
this latter form.
Moreover, evaluating whether a claimed invention satisfies these
statutory conditions for validity or enforcement requires determining
first what the claimed invention iS. 161 The modem U.S. patent system
defines an invention by reference to the textual claims that delineate the
invention in the patent document. 162 Because the patent claims set forth
the "metes and bounds" of the patented invention, 163 construing these
151. See infra Part III.B.
152. See infra Part 1.B.
153. See infra Part HI.C.
154. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112(a)-(b) (2012).
155. Id. § 102.
156. Id. § 103.
157. Id. § 101.
158. Id. § 112(a).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 112(b).
161. See, e.g., Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (requiring "one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention").
163. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989). A "heavy presumption" favors the ordinary and customary meaning, though departures
toward other meanings are allowed when "the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer" or has
otherwise used terminology in non-ordinary ways in order to preserve the validity of the invention
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claims is a necessary prerequisite to any doctrinal assessment of the
invention. And the goal of the claim construction exercise is to ascertain
what a claim term would mean "to a person of ordinary skill in the
art." 64 A fortiori, inquiry into the PHOSITA for claim construction
doubly implicates the field of invention in addition to any PHOSITA
inquiry that may already be inherent in the doctrinal requirement. The
following discussion illustrates these points.
1. Innovation
An invention must be novel, which is to say it must not be
anticipated by a single "prior art" reference-most commonly an earlier
patent, printed publication, product, or process-that was available to
the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.1 65
Anticipation requires complete identity between the claimed invention
and the asserted prior art, so that a single missing element in the prior art
reference is enough to render the claimed invention novel.1 66
Accordingly, the analysis of anticipation usually proceeds as an element-
by-element comparison.1 67
For example, in Carman Industries, Inc. v. Wahl, Carman
challenged Wahl's patent as invalid for, among other things, a lack of
novelty.1 68 The invention was a device that attached to the base of a
storage bin or hopper to improve the outflow of solids that otherwise
flowed poorly.1 69 Asserted as prior art was an earlier patent that
addressed the same problem of poor outflow.170 The following Table
summarizes the element-by-element approach used by the district court
and affirmed by the court of appeals:
in light of all the relevant prior art. Home Diagnostics, 381 F.3d at 1355 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc.
v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
164. L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
166. See Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550,
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
167. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
168. Carman Industries, Inc., v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
169. Id. at 934.
170. Id. at 937.
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TABLE 1: ANTICIPATION ANALYSIS IN CARMAN
INDUSTRIES, INC. V. WAHL1 71
Wahl Patent Prior Art Patent
Conical storage portion to Conical storage portion to
receive material. receive material.
Baffle plate at the top of the Baffle plate at the top of the
conical storage portion. conical storage portion.
Agitation apparatus to shake Agitation apparatus to shake
solids through. solids through.
Multiple concave surfaces in a One or more concave surfaces
series with abrupt breaks in connected in a continuous
slope between them. slope.
Outlet. Outlet.
Because Wahl's invention contained an element that was absent
from the asserted prior art, the prior art did not anticipate Wahl's
invention, and Wahl's invention was novel. 172
At first blush, this mode of analysis may seem viewpoint-neutral,
accessible even to an educated layperson. Yet, anticipation may arise by
inherency, which does look to the PHOSITA. The inherency doctrine
holds that a prior art reference may be anticipatory even without
expressly disclosing an element of the claimed invention if that element
is inherent ii the prior art reference.173 Historically, an element has been
deemed inherent if that element is "necessarily present in the thing
described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons
of ordinary skill."l74
For example, in MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum,
Milgraum argued that MEHL/Biophile's patent was, among other things,
171. Id. at 934-36.
172. Id. at 938.
173. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
174. Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Recently, the Federal Circuit has signaled a possible shift away from requiring that a PHOSITA
would have known or appreciated the inherency. E.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d
1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The shift has been controversial and may reflect a new paradigm of
anticipation in which elements or inventions are inherent if the public already gets the benefit of
them in some way. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 371 (2005) (arguing that inherency in an invention should depend on whether the public
already benefits from a claimed element of that invention). The shift has also been questioned,
however, for its potentially drastic expansion of accidental infringement liability, to the unwarranted
detriment of the public. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA.
L. REV. 571, 598-620 (2016).
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inherently anticipated by a prior art manual.175 The invention was a
process for laser hair removal by targeting skin cells at the base of hair
follicle.' 76 Asserted as prior art was a technical laser manual that
described how to use the laser to remove tattoos (i.e., to target skin cells
that are pigmented with tattoo ink)."' The court found that someone
who targeted pigmented skin cells according to the manual could thereby
target hair follicle cells as well, but this need not necessarily be true."
"Occasional results are not inherent," the court explained, and
MEHL/Biophile's patent was found not to be anticipated by the prior
art manual.17 9
Beyond inherency, moreover, to determine whether a prior art
reference anticipates the claimed invention, one must first construe the
claims."so This too brings the PHOSITA into the anticipation analysis. 8'
In addition to being novel, an invention must be nonobvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art in light of the prior art.'8 2 Like novelty,
nonobviousness is a measure of how inventive the claimed invention is
by comparison to what was previously known.' 83 Unlike anticipation,
however, a finding of obviousness need not be limited to a single prior
art reference. Multiple references may, and almost always are, asserted
in combination. 18 4 The statutory text of the nonobviousness inquiry also
expressly incorporates the viewpoint of the PHOSITA."' As with
anticipation, however, the inquiry first requires that the relevant patent
claims be construed,' 86 which entails identifying the PHOSITA.8
175. MHEL/Biophile Int'l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
176. Id. at 1364.




181. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
182. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
183. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966). For a historical
overview of the nonobviousness doctrine as an inquiry into the "inventive faculty" that must be
demonstrated for patentability, see id. at 10-12. It was also in Graham that the Court articulated the
familiar three-factor analysis and additional considerations for evaluating nonobviousness:
[T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art resolved. . . . Such secondary considerations as commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Id. at 17-18.
184. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 103 ("[A]re such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious ... to a person having ordinary skill in the art.").
186. Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
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For example, in Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., Nu-Star
defeated a charge of infringement by arguing that Ryko's patent was
invalid for obviousness."' The invention was an automatic car wash
activation system employing an electrical numeric keypad, superior to
prior mechanical activation systems such as those that accepted coins,
cards, or other tangible inputs and required burdensome maintenance." 9
Asserted as prior art were the individual components of the combination,
including automatic car wash equipment itself, automatic activation in
general, the use of numeric keypad devices in general as means for
electronic signal input, and the use of computers and digital circuitry in
the car wash industry. 190 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's findings that all this cited prior art was relevant, that the salient
differences between this prior art and the challenged invention were such
that the prior art did "suggest[] the claimed combination," and that the
relevant level of skill in the art was of "an engineer with low to medium
capability in the technology of powered system activation devices."191
Though Ryko's invention apparently solved a long-felt industry need for
automatic car wash activators, succeeded where others had previously
failed, and enjoyed commercial success on the basis of its merits (rather
than unrelated sources of success such as marketing), these secondary
considerations were not enough to overcome the finding that the prior art
suggested the desirability of the claimed invention, and Ryko's invention
was obvious. 192
In addition to being novel and nonobvious, an invention must also
be useful,' 93 though the utility requirement does not mean that an
invention must be an improvement or that it must be an optimal or
exclusive way to achieve a result.1 9 4 Rather, it must operate as
intended.1 95 In this regard, achieving even one stated objective of the
claimed invention is sufficient to establish utility.196 As to how useful an
invention must be, it must have "specific and substantial utility."' 97 An
invention's utility is substantial when one skilled in the art can use the
invention to provide some "significant and presently available benefit to
188. 950 F.2d 714, 715-16, 719-20 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 715.
190. Id. at 716-17.
191. Id. at 717-19.
192. Id. at 719-20.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
194. Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
195. See id.
196. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
197. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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the public."l 98 An invention's utility is specific when the benefit that it
provides. to the public is "well-defined and particular."' 99 Utility, like
novelty, incorporates the viewpoint of the PHOSITA into its inquiry
implicitly. As with novelty and nonobviousness, determining utility also
requires first construing the claim to specify what the invention is,200
which proceeds from the PHOSITA's perspective as well.
For example, in Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., Raytheon challenged
several aspects of Roper's patent as being inoperable and therefore
invalid for a lack of utility.2 0 ' The primary embodiment of the invention
was a common cavity oven for thermal cooking, microwave cooking,
and self-cleaning all using the same chamber.20 2 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's finding that the invention, as correctly
construed, could not have operated in self-cleaning mode without
contaminating the airflow, though this was what the patent claimed.2 03
The phenomenon that supposedly accounted for this surprising and
desirable behavior "does not and physically cannot happen," meaning
that the invention-as-claimed was inoperable, lacking utility.20
2. Disclosure
Beyond the innovation-related requirements that a claimed
invention be new, nonobvious, and useful, patent law imposes
disclosure-related requirements to disseminate this innovative
knowledge to the public. 205 The first of these disclosure requirements is
that the patent document must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the invention. 206 For a patent disclosure to be adequately
enabling, it must not require the PHOSITA to engage in "undue
experimentation" in order to make and use the full scope of the claimed
invention.2 07 As might be intuitive, to determine whether the disclosure
198. Id at 1371 (clarifying Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
199. Id
200. Raytheon Co., 724 F.2d at 956.
201. Id. at 955, 957-58, 961-62.
202. Id. at 953.
203. Id at 956-58.
204. Id at 957.
205. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
206. Id. § 112(a).
207. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To evaluate
whether any required experimentation is undue, courts look to a variety of factors including as
follows:
(1) [T]he quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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adequately enables the full scope of the invention also requires claim
construction to determine what the scope of the invention is, 20 8 and this
also inquires from the viewpoint of the PHOSITA.
For example, in MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage
Technologies, Inc., Hitachi defeated MagSil's claim of infringement by
arguing that the asserted patent was invalid for lack of enablement.2 09
The invention was a set of sensors for digital data storage and broadly
encompassed certain devices wherein an electrical current tunnels in
quantum-mechanical fashion from one electrode to another. 21 0 The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that applying a small
amount of electromagnetic energy to the tunnel junction would, indeed,
change the junction resistance by at least 10%, as the patent claimed, but
that the maximum change was 11.8% under the conditions described. "
The patent claimed more broadly, however, that the invention
contemplated changes in resistance upwards of 100% and even
1000%.212 As the specification did not sufficiently teach how to achieve
these dramatically higher changes in electrical resistance (but the patent
claimed them just the same), practicing the full scope of the invention
would require undue experimentation, and so, the invention was
not enabled.2 13
Related to enablement is the requirement that the patent disclosure
contain a written description of the invention. 214 The written description
resides in a portion of the patent document called the specification,
which contains, for example, a narrative discussion of the technical
background of the claimed invention, the problem sought to be solved,
previous attempts to solve it, and which concludes with the patent claims
themselves.2 15 This is the same disclosure that is evaluated for adequate
enablement, but the written description requirement must do more than
"merely explain how to 'make and use"'-it must, more broadly,
"convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention."216
208. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1352, 1354-57
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (evaluating enablement with respect to the relevant patent claims only as "correctly
construed").
209. 687 F.3d 1377, 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). MagSil was not itself the inventor or owner
of the patent but rather the exclusive licensee. Id. at 1378. For simplicity, however, the discussion
refers to "MagSil's invention" and "MagSil's patent."
210. Id. at 1378-79.
211. Id. at 1381.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1384.
214. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
215. MPEP,supra note 31, § 608.01(a) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(b) (2012)).
216. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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As with enablement, the "invention is, for purposes of the 'written
description' inquiry, whatever is now claimed," inviting claim
construction as a threshold matter.217  The written description
requirement, then, also proceeds from the perspective of the PHOSITA.
For example, in Moba, B. V v. Diamond Automation, Inc., FPS
Food Processing Systems ("FPS") challenged Diamond Automation's
patents as being invalid for, among other reasons, failure to satisfy the
written description requirement. 2 18 The invention was a high-speed egg
processing machine, and the dispute was both whether the invention
specifically included lifting eggs from a moving conveyor (as the
challengers' systems did) and, if so, whether Diamond Automation's
patent specification showed that the inventor possessed this feature
of the invention.219 Challenger FPS argued that the specification
did not do so because it did not disclose a conveyor mechanism. 220
The court of appeals, however, explained that not every particular
functional feature need be recited in order to satisfy the written
description requirement, and affirmed the district court's finding that the
specification described every element of the disputed claim term in
enough detail that a skilled artisan could recognize the inventor's
possession of the invention.2 21 Accordingly, the invention did satisfy the
written description requirement.2 22
3. Boundary Notice
Whereas the enablement and written description requirements
effectuate the teaching function of patents,223 the patent claims
themselves must also be definite (i.e., point out and distinctly claim what
the inventor considers to be the invention). 2 4 By requiring sufficiently
precise claim language, the definiteness requirement provides notice of
the boundaries of the invention-of what subject matter lies inside and
217. Id. at 1564.
218. 325 F.3d 1306, 1319-21 (Fed. Cir. 2003). More precisely, FPS, as well as Moba,
B.V., and Staalkat, B.V.-all competitors of Diamond Automation-sought declaratory judgment
that Diamond Automation's patents were invalid and not infringed. Id. at 1312. For simplicity,
the discussion addresses only the written description-based validity challenge made by FPS on
appeal.
219. Id. at 1319-21.
220. Id. at 1319.
221. Id. at 1320-21.
222. Id. at 1321.
223. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing notice about what the invention is and how to practice it, from notice about the
boundaries of what the patent allows one to exclude others from doing).
224. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
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what lies outside.2 25 Patent claims are indefinite when they "fail to
inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope
of the invention." 2 26 Here, again, the definiteness inquiry requires
recourse to the PHOSITA.227
For example, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc.,
Covidien challenged several of Ethicon's ultrasonic surgical instrument
patents as being invalid for indefiniteness.2 28 Ethicon's invention, in
essence, was a set of surgical shears that both use the energy of blades
vibrating at ultrasonic frequencies to cut vascular tissue and rely on the
heat generated by the vibrating blade to cauterize the relevant blood
vessels. 2 29 The court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that
"nothing in the specification or understanding in the art" specified what,
where, and how to measure certain clamping forces necessary for using
the surgical invention.230 Appellate reevaluation of the evidence,
particularly testimony about well-understood principles of biophysics,
revealed that the specification would have given reasonable certainty
about the scope of the claims to a skilled artisan, and so, the invention
was not indefinite.23 '
B. Clarifying, and Going Beyond, the Person Having Ordinary
Skill in the Art
The major patentability requirements are all explicitly or implicitly
adjudicated by reference to the PHOSITA. Most also require an initial
claim construction to ascertain the meaning of the claims and determine
what the claimed invention actually is, and this also is done from the
perspective of the PHOSITA. In these ways, the above-discussed
225. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002)
(restating the well-established explanation of the boundary notice function that a patent grant is "a
property right, and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear") (internal quotations
omitted).
226. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
227. Id. at 2130. The usual necessity for an initial claim construction, in order to decide
whether the standard is satisfied, is not so simple here. Under the Federal Circuit's prior standard,
claims were indefinite only if they were so imprecisely worded as to be "insolubly ambiguous."
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The standard
of insoluble ambiguity was fundamentally in tension with the very exercise of construing claims,
and if a claim was at all amenable to construction, then it necessarily could not be indefinite.
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For
present purposes, it is enough that the role of the PHOSITA is on solid doctrinal ground within the
definiteness standard itself.
228. 796 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
229. Id.at1315.




requirements implicate the field of invention as well. Yet, these two
inquiries fare quite differently in practice. Identifying the PHOSITA is a
pervasive step both in the ex ante examination of patent applications 232
and in the ex post adjudication of issued patents. As Part II discussed,
identifying the field of invention is a structured process in the USPTO
but a largely ad hoc and underutilized doctrinal tool in the federal
courts.233 The effects of this judicial underutilization are significant for
two reasons.
First, identifying the field of invention would help courts to clarify
the PHOSITA inquiry itself. Courts currently resolve questions of patent
validity and infringement, and identify the PHOSITA on which these
questions rest, within an adversarial system of adjudication. That is to
say, they take their cues from the result-oriented arguments of parties
who have specific interests at stake in characterizing the PHOSITA as
having, for example, a certain level of education, experience, or
creativity, in accordance with desired outcomes. The import of this
adversarial framework for the court's task is that the hypothetical
PHOSITA, already an elusive perspective to access, becomes even more
unlikely to be identified correctly. By engaging first in an evaluation of
what the underlying field of invention actually is-or, more precisely,
was at the relevant time in the past-courts would be able to create a
more objective baseline from which to identify the PHOSITA.
Second, identifying the field of invention would also have a
valuable disciplining effect on how courts evaluate a patent's scope and
breadth apart from any identification of the PHOSITA. Courts have
expressed concern, for example, that patents exploiting natural
phenomena or natural laws in too basic a fashion may foreclose follow-
on innovation in a wide range of research endeavors that may rely on the
phenomenon or law in question; that this would be undesirable; and that
so broad a patent should, therefore, be struck down as invalid.234 This is
patent law's preemption doctrine (not to be confused with federal-state
232. Patent examiners are generally understood to be proxies for the PHOSITA. See, e.g.,
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 277-78 (2007) ("[T]o the extent that the PTO examiner is herself
one of ordinary skill, she simply needs to be made aware of all prior art."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1187-88 (2002)
(noting that identification of the PHOSITA ought to be "an ultimate conclusion of law based upon
evidence, not dictated by the capabilities or knowledge of the Patent Office examiner"); Eisenberg,
supra note 27, at 898 (arguing that patent examiners' experience is in patent examination rather than
in the technological fields that they supposedly represent and, therefore, that examiners generally
"have less technological skill" than the PHOSITA would).
233. See supra Part II (describing the current practice of the USPTO and the courts in
identifying the field of invention).
234. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94,
1296-98 (2012).
930 [Vol. 45:899
THE FIELD OF INVENTION
preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution) and seeks
to avoid "upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly
preempt the use of a natural law."235 Of course, every patent forecloses
some use of the natural law or process on which the claimed invention
relies, 23 6 and so, the problem must be one of degree-and, ultimately, of
the appropriate level of generality. Identifying the field of invention to
which the patented invention pertains, and doing so by deferring
presumptively to the USPTO's classification choices, offers a principled
solution to this question. The field of invention specifies which scientific
community's work must be protected from the unduly broad preemptive
effect of the patent in dispute.237
C. Analogous Arts and the Nature ofInnovation
The above-discussed criteria of patentability have, in some form,
been in place all along, and policy concerns such as preemption are as
old as the Supreme Court's mid-19th century Morse telegraph patent
case 2 3 8 and as current as its 2012 medical diagnostic patent case. 23 9 So it
is perhaps not surprising that patent doctrine has (somewhat) been here
before. Recognizing that there is value to specifying ex ante the universe
of information from which prior art might reasonably be taken, courts
articulated the doctrine of "analogous arts" as early as the late-1870s in
order to guide the efficient and accurate evaluation of a given invention
against relevant existing knowledge. 240 The analogous arts doctrine
pertains specifically to evaluating an invention's nonobviousness and
holds that a prior art reference ought to be considered only if it comes
either from the field of endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the
problem that the inventor was trying to solve.24 1 Whether a prior art
reference that is outside the field of endeavor is, indeed, reasonably
pertinent is to be decided from the perspective of the PHOSITA.242
235. Id. at 1294.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1293-94, 1297-99.
238. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132-33 (1854).
239. Mayo Collaborative Serys., 132 S. Ct. at 1293-95, 1297-98.
240. See, e.g., Crowell v. Harlow, 4 F. 140, 142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1880); Bridge v. Excelsior Mfg.
Co, 4 F. Cas. 94, 94-95 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1879) (No. 1,859). In Bridge, for example, the court
examined the state of the art in the field of the stove-oven invention alone, "without going into the
state of the art in analogous devices." Bridge, 4 F. Cas. at 94-95. Similarly, in Crowell, the court
illustrated its view of inventiveness with the example that "to cure hams by salting and smoking
would not sustain a patent if the virtues of salt and smoke were well known, and had been applied in
analogous arts." Crowell, 1 F. at 142.
241. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
242. Id. at 987.
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There is self-evident difficulty in avoiding hindsight when deciding
to include or exclude prior art for having been reasonably pertinent to a
problem whose solution the invention itself now embodies.2 43 Even aside
from this difficulty, however, the major premise of the analogous arts
doctrine is that an inventor in a field of invention is familiar with the full
range of prior art in that field, as though the inventor were "working in
his shop with the prior art references-which he is presumed to know-
hanging on the walls around him."24 4 The potentially large scale of this
imputed body of knowledge makes it very important, as a threshold
matter, to characterize the field of invention correctly.
Not coincidentally, the conceptual structure of the analogous arts
doctrine maps directly to the two approaches that patent examiners use
in searching for prior art and, indeed, inventors themselves use to
familiarize themselves with the universe of information for which they
will be held accountable: hierarchical searching and keyword-based
searching.245 The more closed-ended field of endeavor corresponds to
the taxon-bound hierarchical approach whereas the more open-ended set
of all prior art that may be reasonably pertinent to the inventive problem
at hand corresponds to the cross-cutting keyword-based approach.246
In fact, the very existence of numerous competing methodologies
for defining and classifying business method- and software-related
patents,2 47 all of which are partly or fully reducible to a hierarchical or
keyword-based strategy, reflects why business method and software are
such excellent illustrations of the need for a structured administrative
law approach to making judicial findings about the field of invention.
Business methods and software are general-purpose technologies that
can, and do, act as inputs into a wide range of other technologies. 248 As a
result, their taxonomic character is both highly difficult to characterize
ex ante, though the USPTO makes its systematic effort, and highly prone
to rapid change over time, creating particular risk of hindsight bias and
other errors ex post in the courts.
243. See Simon, supra note 91, at 31. For a systematic discussion of how the analogous arts
doctrine tends in particular to discriminate against inventions that arise from "long toil and
experimentation" rather than from a "flash of genius," see Sherkow, supra note 91, at 1120-26
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (1952 Revision Notes)).
244. See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
245. See supra text accompanying note 132.
246. See Hal Milton, How the Internet Has Removed the Historical Rationale for "Non-
Analogous Arts," 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 68, 89-90 (2013).
247. See supra Part II.C.I.
248. See Graham & Vishnubhakat, supra note 123, at 74-75; see also Timothy F. Bresnahan &
Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies 'Engines of Growth'?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS
83, 97-102 (1995).
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But such risk is present even in simple technologies, suggesting that
the analogous arts doctrine cannot fully resolve the level-of-generality
problem even in the limited context of nonobviousness. For example, in
the leading analogous arts case of In re Bigio, the Federal Circuit
invalidated a patent on a type of bristled hairbrush, finding the invention
obvious in light of a prior bristled toothbrush.2 49 Significantly, the case
turned not on whether one of ordinary skill in hairbrush technology
would have found the bristled hairbrush obvious in light of the bristled
toothbrush but rather on whether someone building a better hairbrush
should reasonably be expected to look to innovations in toothbrush
design for guidance.250 Over a commonsense dissent from Judge
Newman,25 ' the court answered yes.252 Yet, the same question could also
have been resolved by defining the field of endeavor more broadly (e.g.,
things with bristles), leaving no need at all to evaluate reasonably
pertinent prior art outside that field. The underlying question of how to
define the field of invention remained unanswered in Bigio.
Accordingly, even this limited judicial flirtation with the field of
invention, in the context of a single patentability requirement, has been
justly criticized as an incomplete and unrealistic attempt to capture how
innovation actually takes place. 253 The analogous arts doctrine has been
described by some commentators as forgivable in the USPTO but
inappropriate in the courts2 54 or even wholly obsolete.255
The central role that the field of invention occupies across patent
doctrine 25 6 suggests, however, that if the doctrine of analogous arts has a
flaw, it is not that the doctrine attempts too much but that its limited
applicability to nonobviousness attempts too little. For their part, courts
continue to rely on it as a meaningful doctrinal guidepost toward
resolving the ever-difficult issue of placing oneself in the position of the
inventor, 25 7 perhaps recognizing implicitly the unavoidability of some
taxonomic exercise, however limited. Accordingly, the basic normative
claim of this Article is that technological classification cannot be
249. 381 F.3d 1320, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
250. Id. at 1326.
251. Id. at 1327-28 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing on the analogousness issue that "[a]
brush for hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth than does hair resemble teeth").
252. Id. at 1326-27.
253. See Laura G. Pedraza-Farifia, Patent Law and the Sociology ofInnovation, 2013 WIs. L.
REv. 813, 861-67.
254. See Simon, supra note 91, at 32, 49-50, 55-58.
255. Milton, supra note 246, at 70-73.
256. See supra Part HI.A.
257. Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1334-37 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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avoided and so ought to be undertaken in a principled fashion across all
the patent doctrines that rely on it. The question is how.
IV. TAKING TAXONOMIC AUTHORITY SERIOUSLY
Part II argues that the USPTO determines the field of invention in a
systematic fashion, that the courts do little or nothing with this useful
information, and that the result is needless inefficiency and doctrinal
confusion."'8 This suggested that courts might reengage readily with
USPTO taxonomic choices, and at an acceptable institutional cost, but as
Part II concludes, such reengagement has been hamstrung by a patent
exceptionalism in administrative law.259 Part III then traces the effects of
this constellation of problems and hurdles across patent doctrine and
policy.26 0 This Part discusses how the proposed judicial reengagement
with USPTO classifications should proceed.26' The proposal, in brief, is
for a doctrine of express judicial deference to USPTO determinations of
the field of invention.262
Subpart A sets forth two related arguments about the contours of
deference. 263 First, USPTO classification decisions are best understood
as informal adjudications of fact.264 Second, although it is not
impermissible for juries to review USPTO classification decisions, it is
preferable for judges to do so. 265 Building on these premises, Subpart B
argues that the mode of judicial review appropriate to a USPTO
classification decision is the deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard, though, under current Federal Circuit doctrine, a presumption
in favor of the USPTO classification, rebuttable either by substantial
evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, may be a likely second-
best solution-and achieve similar, if not identical, results. 266
A. Characterizing the Act of Classification
Under administrative law principles, the deference that courts owe
to agency actions turns on three considerations: whether the action is
legislative or adjudicative; whether the action is formal or informal; and
258. See supra Part I.
259. See supra Part II.
260. See supra Part III.
261. See infra Part V.A-B.
262. See infra Part IV.B.
263. See infra Part IV.A.
264. See infra Part IVA.1.
265. See infra Part IV.A.2.
266. See infra Part IV.B.
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whether the action pertains to a legal issue or a factual one. 267 The
modem patent law practice of jury review also bears on how deference
may operate upon USPTO technological classifications. 268 This Subpart
addresses each issue in turn.2 69
1. Classification as Informal Adjudication of Fact
Administrative decision-making generally falls into two categories:
rulemaking and adjudication. 270 Rulemaking generally describes an
agency's articulation of generally applicable principles with prospective
effect and a policy orientation. 271 By comparison, adjudication refers to
an agency's resolution of individual disputes.272 The classification
actions that the USPTO takes with respect to incoming patent
applications is best understood as an adjudication because it resolves the
taxonomic inquiry for individual patent applications.2 73 What is
generally applicable, has prospective effect, and reflects the agency's
policy judgment of how to classify inventions is not any individual
classification choice but rather the USPC hierarchy itself.
Adjudications, in turn, may be formal or informal depending on
what procedural requirements must be satisfied. 274 Formal adjudications
require trial-like procedures with a host of safeguards, including notice
of the factual and legal matters asserted, opportunity to submit and
consider facts and arguments, and opportunity to propose findings and
conclusions to the adjudicator.275 Informal adjudications, however,
require far less.276 Though quite structured and systematic, the patent
classification process does not contain any of the indicia of formal
adjudication, and no requirement compels the USPTO to provide such
indicia. 277 Therefore, the classification process is best understood as an
informal adjudication.2 78
Doctrinally, of course, courts must know whether the issue that is
actually resolved in the classification process (i.e., what the field of
267. See infra Part IV.A.I.
268. See infra Part IV.A.2.
269. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
270. 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:1 (3d ed. 2010).
271. 1 id. § 4:1.
272. 2 id. § 5:1.
273. See supra Part .A.1.
274. 2 KOCH, supra note 270, § 5:1.
275. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990) (summarizing the
procedural safeguards of formal adjudication under 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2012)).
276. 2 KOCH, supra note 270, § 5:1.
277. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, § 1.1.
278. 2 KOCH, supra note 270, § 5:1.
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invention actually is) is a legal issue or a factual one. 27 9 At bottom, the
act of classification locates the salient attributes of a particular invention
within an ontological scheme of all technologies and so makes a
descriptive claim about the physical world. This suggests that identifying
the field of invention is a finding of fact. Precedent from antitrust law
supports this conclusion as well, as the similar taxonomic exercise of
defining a relevant market before analyzing effects upon competition is
also regarded as a finding of fact rather than of law.280
Not least, the informal-indeed, highly routine-character of the
USPTO's taxonomic exercise does not exempt the agency from the need
to enable meaningful judicial review of its fact finding, either on direct
appeal when patent applications have been denied or on collateral review
when issued patents are being reevaluated as to their validity.28 1 In this
regard, the very assignment of a primary class and, what is less directly
important, assignment of search classes to a patent application constitute
the USPTO's findings regarding the fact of what the field of invention
is. This may prove to be enough, as the "searching and careful" review
that courts are to give to agency actions is nevertheless "a narrow one.
The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency." 282 However, if a court were to require more, then the USPTO
could formalize its classification straightforwardly in an interstitial order
to be placed in the prosecution file of the patent application.283
2. Juries and Judges as Reviewing Authorities
Ordinarily, it would be sufficient for deference purposes to know
that the USPTO makes an informal adjudication of fact when it
identifies the field of invention and classifies an application
accordingly. 284 However, modem patent practice contains an additional
feature that bears on what form of deference courts may give to the
279. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
280. U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 994 (11th Cir. 1993); Borough
of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1982); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982); Pinder v. Hudgins Fish Co., 570
F.2d 1209, 1219-20 (5th Cir. 1978). For detailed discussion of the relationship of the market
definition concept to intellectual property, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi
Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2059-75
(2012).
281. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416-17 (1990) (noting
that judicial review of agency findings of fact "is to be searching and careful" and that such review
may be "hampered by [an agency actor's] failure to make such findings").
282. Id.
283. 2 KoCH, supra note 270, § 5:17(b).
284. 3 id. § 10:12.
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USPTO's classification choices as a practical matter. That feature is
jury review.2 85
As a pair of articles have recently discussed in depth, jury review of
patent validity is somewhat anomalous, though not unprecedented, in
administrative law.286 Nearly seventy years ago, the Supreme Court
decided in Cox v. United States that there was no constitutional right to
jury review of an administrative decision,28 7 even in cases properly
before a jury where the invalidity of the agency decision would be a
defense. 288 This squarely describes patent litigation, where the invalidity
of the patent being asserted is a defense and where the patent grant itself
reflects the USPTO's determination as an agency that the patent was,
indeed, valid.289
For present purposes, the upshot of these commentaries is that the
history of administrative practice in civil cases offers little precedent and
no constitutional guarantee of jury review,29 0 but that a more complete
view of the relationship between administrative law and historical
safeguards in criminal law reveals that "[j]ury review of executive and
administrative actions is precedented and possible, but not preferred."291
As Professor John F. Duffy has explained, jury review is appropriate as a
backstop when no other mechanism exists for reviewing the legality of
executive action, though "across broad areas of law, our legal culture has
pushed to replace [the inconveniences of jury review] with a
combination of executive branch decisionmaking coupled with
judicial oversight." 2 92
On this view, the modem patent system may be well rid of jury
review of patent validity because the USPTO offers a range of new
administrative post-grant proceedings to reevaluate the validity of
patents previously issued by the agency2 93 and because these
proceedings (as well as the USPTO's traditional patent examination) are
subject to robust judicial oversight by the Federal Circuit. 29 4 It is true
285. See John F. Duffy, Jury Review of Administrative Action, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
281, 298 (2013).
286. Id. at 286-90; Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L.
REv. 1673, 1704-12 (2013).
287. 332 U.S. 442,448-49 (1947).
288. Duffy, supra note 285, at 285 & n.3 (first citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.16, at 597 (1958); and then citing LOUis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 394 (1965)).
289. See Ford, supra note 71, at 78.
290. See Lemley, supra note 286, at 1707-08.
291. Duffy, supra note 285, at 285.
292. Id.
293. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319, 321 (2012).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4) (2012).
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that reevaluation in the courts of a patent's validity is not purely a
review of the administrative record, as is usually the case-new
evidence of invalidity such as unconsidered prior art may be
introduced-but the complexity of reviewing patent validity does still
appear to lie outside the competency of lay jurors.295
Nevertheless, the administrative law of the patent system currently
deviates in a number of important ways from the general body of
administrative law,296 including jury review of the USPTO's findings of
patent validity.297 If this deviation persists, then any deference to the
USPTO's antecedent findings about the field of invention must rest on
this current doctrine, second best though it may be.
B. Deference to United States Patent and Trademark
Office Classifications
As Subpart A explains, the USPTO's individual technological
classifications of patent applications are best understood as informal
adjudications of fact that ought to be reviewed by a judge but that may,
under current patent-administrative law doctrine, be reviewed instead by
a jury.298 These considerations all point toward a doctrine of highly
deferential review of the USPTO's classification decisions.
1. The General Case for Deference
As a general matter, there are at least three reasons why the courts
should look to the USPTO's technological classifications with
deference. One reason is that the USPTO has the technical expertise
necessary to devise, maintain, and adapt a comprehensive taxonomy of
technological subject areas. The USPTO also has long institutional
experience with this task. The first USPC scheme was promulgated in
1900,299 and the USPTO has issued more than 1800 reclassification
orders beginning in 1947 and concluding most recently in 2012.30 This
demonstrated record of expertise illustrates the USPTO's relative
competence over that of the courts and counsels in favor of deference.30 1
295. Duffy, supra note 285, at 297-98.
296. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 284-308.
297. Duffy, supra note 285, at 297-98.
298. See supra Part IV.A.
299. HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION, supra note 36, at 1.
300. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT
CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION ORDERS ARCHIVAL REPORT (CLASSIFICATION ORDERS 1
THROUGH 1919) (2013), www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resources/classification/archive
rpt.pdf.
301. Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action,
59 TEx. L. REv. 1175, 1194 (1981) (reciting the established principle that "courts appropriately
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A second reason is that the classification of inventions has long
been delegated to the USPTO by organic statute. Congress first gave this
authority to the USPTO in 1898 and directed the agency to exercise that
authority immediately.30 2  Subsequently, in the 1952 Patent Act,
Congress increased the USPTO's discretion in this regard by leaving
intact the USPTO's authority while withdrawing the command to
exercise it, a state of affairs that has existed to the present day.303 This
statutory history demonstrates a clear and sustained congressional intent
that the USPTO be the patent system's prime mover in matters of
classification.304 This, too, counsels in favor of deference.
A third reason is that the USPTO is closer in time, sometimes
considerably closer, to a given act of invention than the courts are. It is
unavoidable that even "[p]atent examination is necessarily conducted by
hindsight, with complete knowledge of the applicant's invention."30 5 For
courts, however, the scale of hindsight is far longer. The pendency of a
patent application through the examination process has risen to over
three years at the median,30 6 and nearly two-thirds of asserted patents are
not asserted until five years or more after issuance from the USPTO.307
Therefore, the USPTO is better positioned than the courts are to identify
a given patent's field of invention accurately and to do so without the
added complication of partisan arguments driven by high litigation
accord the greatest deference to an agency's factual findings, since these are largely the product of
technical expertise").
302. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1946) (Revision of Classification of Letters Patent and Printed
Publications; Additional Personnel). Congress provided:
That for the purpose of determining with more readiness and accuracy the novelty of
inventions for which applications for letters patent are or may be filed in the United
States Patent Office, and to prevent the issuance of letters patent of the United States for
inventions which are not new, the Commissioner of Patents is hereby authorized and
directed to revise and perfect the classification, by subjects-matter, of all letters patent
and printed publications in the United States Patent Office which constitute the field of
search in the examination as to the novelty of intentions for which applications for
patents are or may be filed.
Id.
303. 35 U.S.C. § 9 (1952). Congress provided: "The Commissioner may revise and maintain
the classification by subject matter of United States letters patent, and such other patents and printed
publications as may be necessary or practicable, for the purpose of determining with readiness and
accuracy the novelty of inventions for which applications for patent are filed." Id.
304. Id.
305. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
306. BENJAMIN MITRA-KAHN ET AL., UK INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE & U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT BACKLOGS, INVENTORIES AND PENDENCY: AN INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK 31-32 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
data/file/311239/ipresearch-uspatlog-201306.pdf.




stakes. The USPTO's greater capacity for accuracy in this regard also
warrants deference as a normative matter.
2. Judicial Review of United States Patent and Trademark
Office Classifications
Just how much deference the courts should show to the USPTO
turns on the nature of the classification decision as an informal
adjudication of fact.308 Generally, review of informal adjudications
tolerates all agency actions except those that are arbitrary and
capricious.3 09 A court may use the somewhat less deferential standard of
substantial evidence review when an adequate administrative record is
available,3 10 but even so, "[t]he higher reasonableness standard
expressed by the substantial evidence language does not apply to
individual adjudications"311  such as determining technological
classifications. Accordingly, when reviewing agency action for arbitrary
and capricious behavior, "the court should undertake a searching inquiry
while ultimately accepting the risk of error expressed by the
arbitrariness tandard."3 12
Although ordinary principles of administrative law counsel a highly
deferential arbitrary and capricious review of USPTO classification
decisions, patent law's idiosyncratic body of administrative doctrine
may pose doctrinal problems in two contexts.3 13 One is direct court-
agency review of USPTO decisions to deny patent applications.314 The
other is collateral review by courts of the validity of patents that the
USPTO has already issued.315
In direct court-agency review of denied patent applications, Federal
Circuit precedent regards USPTO examination to be sufficiently formal
as to warrant substantial evidence review, in contrast to suggestions-
especially by Justice Breyer-in the Zurko oral argument that USPTO
308. See supra Part IV.A.1.
309. 3 KOCH, supra note 270, § 10:12.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Duke Power Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 770
F.2d 386, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1985)).
313. See supra text accompanying note 306.
314. Procedurally, a patent examiner's final rejection of a patent application undergoes
administrative review in the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") (previously the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences), and the PTAB decision is subject to judicial review in
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Only denials are reviewed: an agency decision to grant
a patent is not subject to direct administrative or judicial review.
315. This type of collateral judicial review may arise either as an accused infringer's defense in
an infringement litigation or else as a potential infringer's suit for declaratory judgment.
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examination is an informal proceeding and should receive arbitrary and
capricious review.316 Meanwhile, in collateral review by a court of
patent validity, Federal Circuit precedent is well established that a duly
issued patent is presumed valid" and that an alleged or potential
infringer who challenges the patent's validity in court bears the burden
of rebutting that presumption.' To do so, the challenger must prove the
subsidiary facts of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 3 19
Within these frameworks, then, it is arguable that the USPTO's
factual finding about the field of a given invention should survive direct
court-agency review ex ante unless substantial evidence is lacking and
should survive collateral review ex post unless clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary is presented. As Part II discusses, the field of
invention informs the inquiry into the PHOSITA and underlies virtually
all the major doctrinal requirements of patent validity.320 The ultimate
conclusion of patent validity is an issue of law,321' and although some
requirements such as nonobviousneSs3 22 and enablement323 are also
issues of law, while other requirements such as utility3 2 4 and novelty325
are issues of fact, the technological classification that underlies all of
these issues would undoubtedly be a subsidiary fact.
These precedents are questionable as a matter of administrative law,
but even so, they are unlikely to make a significant difference in the
outcome. With respect to USPTO classification decisions, substantial
326 aswl s. 327evidence review, as well as clear and convincing evidence review,
should be approximately as deferential as arbitrary and capricious
review. 32 Substantial evidence review, for its part, relies by definition
on the agency record.329 Meanwhile, successful showings of clear and
convincing evidence tend in practice to rely on new information that was
316. Compare In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2000), with Transcript of Oral
Argument at *4-*8, Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (No. 98-377), 1999 WL 190969. See
also supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the Federal Circuit's refusal both before and after Zurko to defer
to USPTO fact-finding under a standard of arbitrary and capricious review).
317. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
318. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100 (2011).
319. Id.
320. See supra Part II.
321. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
322. Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
323. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac and Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
324. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
325. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
326. 3 KOCH, supra note 270, § 10:12, at 398-99.
327. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 284.
328. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 301, at 1184-86.
329. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
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not before the USPTO, such as newly discovered prior art.330 However,
where classifying a patent application is concerned, the relevant standard
would simply be the publicly available USPC,33' and the relevant
technological facts on which the classification decision were based
would be contained entirely within the four corners of the patent
application document itself-this, after all, is what the USPTO's own
classification decision was based on. With no new information to present
nor any new fact-finding for the court to conduct in this regard, judicial
(or jury) review would amount merely to a reevaluation of the
administrative record, if any, pertaining to the classification process.
Thus, whether in substantial evidence review33 2 of the record or clear
and convincing evidence review333 of the record, the net effect would
likely be the same high likelihood of affirmance as with the deferential
arbitrary and capricious review.334
3. Operationalizing Deference
Thus far, this Subpart has discussed why the federal courts should
defer to USPTO determinations of the field of invention and what level
of deference courts should give. 3 5 Also important are the mechanics of
how judicial deference would actually play out in practice. As an initial
matter, courts that defer to the USPTO must be able to translate the
agency's classification decision into a narrative expression of the field of
invention.336 For example, in the earlier-discussed U.S. Patent No.
7,052,096 on a vehicle antilock brake control system, a court would see
that the patent belongs to class 303 and subclass 123 (which may
otherwise appear as 303/123).337 One possible approach for the court is
to define the field of invention at the level of the primary class which,
for this patent, would be "fluid-pressure and analogous brake
systems." 3 8 Another possible approach is to define the field of the
invention at the fullest level of classification that the USPTO provides
330. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 110-11 (2011) (noting that "new evidence
supporting an invalidity defense may 'carry more weight' in an infringement action than evidence
previously considered by the PTO" because "if the PTO did not have all material facts before it, its
considered judgment may lose significant force").
331. HANDBOOK OF CLASSIFICATION, supra note 36, at 1.
332. 3 KOCH, supra note 270, § 10:12, at 398-99.
333. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 284.
334. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 301, at 1184-86.
335. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
336. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
337. U.S. Patent No. 7,052,096 (filed Aug. 7, 2002) (issued May 30, 2006).
338. Class Schedule: Class 303: Fluid-Pressure and Analogous Brake Systems, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 11, 2011, 9:44 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/
uspc303/sched303.htm.
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which, including the class and subclass for this patent, would be "fluid-
pressure and analogous brake systems for a tractor-trailer type
vehicle."339 Still another possible approach is to rely not only on the
primary class (and, perhaps, subclass) but also on the search classes
(and, perhaps, subclasses) that the USPTO assigned to the patent.
Upon translating the USPTO classification decision into a finding
of what the field of invention was, the court must then be able to apply
that finding to its further taxonomy-relevant decisions, particularly
whether to include or exclude prior art. As the example of the antilock
brake patent illustrates, the set of prior art references that would be
relevant would be quite different depending on the level of generality at
which the field of invention were drawn. Using the entire primary class
would sweep in more prior art than using the primary class and subclass.
Likewise, using the primary class as well as search classes would sweep
in more prior art than using only the primary class.
Although there is no a priori reason to favor one of these
approaches necessarily over another, the principle of cognitive economy
in classification counsels in favor of defining at the level of the primary
class alone, rather than narrowing the field to the subclass or include any
search classes.3 40 Defining at the detailed level of class and subclass
would likely result in an unmanageably atomistic collection of narrow
subjects. By contrast, setting definitions solely at the level of technology
class (rather than including subclass) would not result in too few
categories. Each category would be broader, but not so broad that the
field of invention could not be meaningfully focused. The reason is that
the USPC currently contains hundreds of utility patent classes, allowing
ample detail even without delving into subclasses.341 Search classes,
meanwhile, do not represent the USPTO's view of the field to which the
invention pertains but rather answer the corollary question of what other
fields might contain information that would be relevant to an assessment
of the invention's contribution to the state of knowledge.3 42
339. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CLASS DEFINITION: CLASS
303, FLUID-PRESSURE AND ANALOGOUS BRAKE SYSTEMS (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/web/
patents/classification/uspc303/defs303.pdf.
340. Cognitive economy refers simply to the basic goal of taxonomy: obtaining "a great deal of
information about the environment while conserving finite resources as much as possible." Eleanor
Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 28-29 (Eleanor Rosch &
Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
341. Select US Classes by Number with Title Menu, supra note 42.
342. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, supra note 29, § 1.5.1.
Doctrinally, the primary class and the set of search classes may be understood as aligning
respectively with the analogous arts doctrine's two-part inquiry into the field of endeavor and into
fields likely to turn up information that would have been "reasonably pertinent" to the problem
sought to be addressed by the inventor in making the invention.
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If the prior art reference in question were a patent, that patent's own
primary class number would indicate whether it does or does not belong
to the field of invention of the patent-in-suit. If the prior art were non-
patent literature instead--such as a scientific journal article, a trade
publication, a publicly available product, or the like-then the court
could turn to the USPTO's class definition and associated notes to
determine whether a particular reference fit the definition or not.3 43
In this way, the courts could engage in a useful taxonomic practice
that would focus nearly all its subsequent tasks and, by using a
framework of judicial deference to agency expertise, would not impose
additional institutional costs on the judicial process. Identifying the field
of invention would not likely impose any greater financial costs on the
litigants, either. It is certainly to be expected that making the field of
invention would cause litigants to reallocate their resources to this
threshold issue. The additional clarity to be gained from the court's
determination, however, would considerably narrow the scope of later
disputes within the litigation, and this narrowed scope would likely bring
greater savings in the long run.
V. CONCLUSION
The dramatic current reallocation of institutional authority in the
U.S. patent system has had a number of far-reaching effects provoking
much scrutiny and debate. It is appropriate and timely, then, that the
taxonomic inquiry that underlies nearly every major doctrine in patent
law should be a salient part of this structural dialogue. The principal
contribution of this Article is to describe that taxonomic inquiry, to
explain that administrative law exceptionalism (itself under increased
attack) is a likely reason that courts fail to use the taxonomy, and to
propose clear and simple principles for reform.344
By expressly identifying the field of invention and doing so through
deference to the USPTO's expert determination, the federal courts can
reap immediate benefits for the patent system.3 45 A clear and principled
statement of what the art actually is would lend discipline to the
ubiquitous but difficult inquiry into the PHOSITA, and this discipline
would have a salutary effect on the quality of virtually all patentability
343. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 43. For
the anti-lock brake patent, the class definition for primary class 303 is as follows: "This class relates
to the distribution of fluid to brake motors, i.e., the utilization of fluid-pressure in the operation of
brakes." Id.
344. See supra Parts .C, IV.
345. See supra Part IV.
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determinations, which rely on the PHOSITA construct.3 4 6 Ordinary
administrative law principles already point the way, and a shift is already
proceeding away from the historically crabbed and isolated view of how
the patent system fits, and ought to fit, within the administrative state.347
The result is that a powerful and largely ignored source of valuable
information and much-needed clarity is available for the courts in their
engagement with issues of patent validity and enforcement. 348 What
ought to make this Article's call for courts to pay closer attention to the
field of invention particularly attractive is that the invitation entails little
judicial cost.3 49 The USPTO already carries out the taxonomic exercise
in a highly structured fashion that it has refined over more than a
century.35 o Courts, relying either on ordinary principles of administrative
law or even on idiosyncratic principles of administrative law within the
patent system, need only to stop ignoring the fruits of the USPTO's
labors. Through a doctrine of judicial deference to the USPTO's
classification decisions, the courts can restore considerable certainty to
the expectations of patent owners and can restore the public's confidence
that the scope of patents will be more manageably stable over time. 351
346. See supra Part HI.A.
347. See supra Part II.C.2.
348. See supra Part IV.B.
349. See supra Part IV.B.3.
350. See supra Part H.A.
351. See supra Part W.A.
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FIGURE 3: TENDENCY OF INVENTORS TO CHARACTERIZE THE FIELD
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THE FIELD OF INVENTION: DR UGS & MEDICAL





Month of Potnt lsumne
2017] 947
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW
FIGURE 5: TENDENCY OF INVENTORS TO CHARACTERIZE
THE FIELD OF INVENTION: ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
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FIGURE 7: TENDENCY OF INVENTORS TO CHARACTERIZE THE
FIELD OF INVENTION: OTHERS
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